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of Mr. Spencer's own works, with which the readers of this REVIEW are familiar. He treats of the fundamental ideas of Spencerism as set forth in the *First Principles*, and then goes on to speak, of the evolution of life and of mind, of the economic, political, and ethical evolution of society, following, of course, the lines laid down by Spencer himself, and of the evolution of religion. The book closes with an estimate of the philosophical and religious significance of Spencerism as a whole. With regard to Mr. Spencer's biological doctrines I am not competent to speak ; nor have I space here to enter on any criticism of his psychological views, or of his extended and laborious treatment of social and political questions, interesting as such a discussion might be.

But one of his psychological doctrines, which has a bearing on philosophy, deserves a brief remark, especially as Mr. Macpherson deems it of great importance. I refer to the doctrine that what are called necessary truths are the product of the experience of our ancestors extending through ages, and registered in some unaccountable way in the nervous system, until they now appear to be innate forms of thought. This theory is termed by the author of this book " Mr. Spencer's great philosophical contribution, whereby he revolutionized the science of psychology by bringing to an end the historic feud between the intuitionists and the experimentalists " (p. 113). I am obliged to tell Mr. Macpherson that philosophers and psychologists regard that particular theory as little better than nonsense, and as being its own refutation.

That Mr. Spencer has done useful work in various departments of thought is universally admitted ; but the question arises whether his work can properly be termed a philosophy. Mr. Macpherson of course deems it so, but according to his definition of philosophy as given in this book, it is not. He says : " Science has been defined as the systematization of our knowledge of phenomena. In a word, science deals with the modes of existence ; philosophy with the nature of existence " (p. 30). Now, if that is true, and it certainly contains a large measure of truth, Mr. Spencer's system of thought is not a philosophy ; for he expressly repudiates the attempt to explain the nature of existence. The nature of matter and force, of life and mind, is in his opinion utterly inscrutable ; and at the heart of things he postulates an Infinite Power which is and must forever remain unknowable. Moreover, evolution is not a law, but a process, not a cause but a series of effects ; and, consequently, the evolutionary scheme is descriptive merely and not explanatory. For these reasons I cannot regard the Spencerian doctrine, even admitting its truth, as a philosophy at all, but only as a coördination of the sciences ; and this, I believe, will be the verdict of posterity.

JAMES B. PETERSON.

Psychology : Empirical and Rational. By MICHAEL MAHER. Fourth Edition, rewritten and enlarged. London, New York, and Bombay, Longmans, Green & Co., 1900.—pp. xvi, 602, xii.

The first edition of this work may be considered the joint product of two very different forces : the Encyclical, *Aeterni Patris*, of Pope Leo XIII., and the examinations in psychology set by the University of London. The former influence was one of vast importance ; it emphasized a leading characteristic of our age, that of centralization, since it united and harmonized the scattered labors of Catholic philosophers. The latter influence was to a large extent directed by Mill, Bain, and subsequently Sully, many of whose principles Stonyhurst, in common with other institutions, refuses to accept. The Stonyhurst Psychology aimed to reconcile these two movements by insisting on the continuity of philosophic thought, by searching both Aristotelian and Scholastic principles of psychology in the light of modern discovery and progress in science, and by constructing out of these elements a system of psychology adequate to our present needs. Now, it is, in a measure, true to say that these views and aims are not new. They were emphasized by Professor Cattell before the American Psychological Association in 1895, and by Professor James in his *Talks on Psychology* (p. 7). The latter authority there states : "There is no 'new psychology' worthy of the name. There is nothing but the old psychology which began in Locke's time [*sic*], plus a little physiology of the brain and senses and theory of evolution, and a few refinements of introspective detail."

Yet in the first edition of the work before us there were certain reserves that did not commend themselves even to all who sympathized with the work and appreciated its importance. These deemed it not merely 'advisable,' to quote the words of the Preface, but even *imperative*, "to indicate the methods and chief results of the most recent investigations in physiology and psychophysics which seem to touch our subject" (p. viii). Nor were they willing to admit that "very little light is thrown on philosophical or psychological problems by these branches of knowledge" (p. ix). It is gratifying to note that whereas the second and third editions of the work remained substantially unaltered, the fourth is much more in touch with the age.

A comparison of the table of contents in the first edition with that of the last, shows not only that the author has developed many topics more fully, but likewise that he has modified his appreciation of their relative importance. The Internal Senses are not now treated in a separate chapter, but are associated with the External Senses (Chap. V). Chapters VII (Development of Sense Perception), IX (Memory, Mental Association), X (Sensuous Appetite and Movement), XII (Intellect and Sense), XIII (Origin of Intellectual Ideas), XV (Judgment and Reasoning), are much enlarged. In Chapter XVI, Apperception is now associated in the title with Attention. Determinism is made a prominent topic, and with Free-Will has a chapter to itself. Theories of the Ego occupy two chapters, and Hypnotism is discussed in one of the supplements. Chapter VI, on the Perception of the Material World, and Chapters XIII and XIV, on the Origin of Intellectual Ideas, really belong to Epistemology, and therefore might have been ex-

cluded from the treatise. Mercier, of Louvain, refers them to Critical Logic. The many principles and arguments which make up the bulk of a Philosophy of Mind, our author prefers to treat conjointly with the *phenomena* of mind, and in this he is not without precedent.

The physiological aspect of psychology is presented in the first part of the book. Four pages of illustrative plates have been inserted. "The large quantity of fresh psychological literature which had appeared [since the first edition], especially in America," called for an "enlarged treatment of physiology, psychophysics, and psychometry" as effecting the phenomena of mind. But in this treatment we find some inaccuracies and some inconsistencies. Thus, while it is true that the scope and meaning of Weber's law are still under discussion, yet it is an extreme position to hold that the advocates of psychophysics mistake and seriously exaggerate the value of that branch of study (p. 57). Moreover, the author fails to emphasize sufficiently the principle of which this law is an incomplete expression, a principle discussed by Professor Barberia, of Piacenza, in an interesting paper, *l'Esthésimétrie et la psychologie de Saint-Thomas*, at the Catholic International Scientific Congress held in Paris, in 1888. Besides, does not the author contradict himself when he asserts (p. 27) that "very faint impressions on the sense-organs are ordinarily not perceived"?

When he speaks (p. 61) of "the 'personal equation' of different observers which has to be taken into account in certain delicate astronomical observations," he is limiting this condition to an extremely narrow sphere. The personal equation is an important element in every conscious act of man. It affects poet, painter, sculptor, and literary artist. It tinges our views of religion and of science. And evidence is not lacking that our author himself has not escaped its influence. Historically, it may be considered the normal equilibrium following the reaction against Kant's extreme subjectivism.

In the chapter on Memory there is no reference to the patient investigation of Ebbinghaus. In the discussion of the Immortality of the Human Soul, the later views of Professor James, as stated in his Ingersoll Lecture at Harvard about two years ago, might have found place, particularly since they imply some approach, though remote, to the teaching set forth in the Stonyhurst Psychology. The treatment of Free-Will in Gutberlet's *Die Willensfreiheit und ihre Gegner*, is so broad, judicious, and pertinent, that this brochure should not have been relegated to the list of readings (p. 424). It would have been a distinct gain when denying "the necessity of assuming the existence of another ultimate faculty [that of Feeling] generically distinct from those of cognition and appetency" (p. 221), to have noted the excellent contribution to this topic from the pen of St. George Mivart in the *American Catholic Quarterly Review*, 1878, under the title of *Emotion*. A like criticism of incompleteness is to be pronounced on the following statement: "Some recent authors appear at times to believe that these

methods of inductive inquiry [employed to-day in experimental psychology] are a result of modern discovery, and that surprising advances of an undefined character have been, or in the immediate future will be, effected by their means in our knowledge of the nature of mind" (p. 18). It is indeed true that Aristotle (and later on, the best of the Schoolmen) did insist on induction; and this fact has been noted of the former not merely by Barthélemy St. Hilaire, whom our author cites, but likewise by Domet de Vorges in a series of interesting papers in the *Annales de philosophie Chrétienne*, 1891, and in our own country, by Professor Cattell. But it is also a fact that the modern phases, and the recent development of psychology, were conditioned by the development chiefly of physics and biology. The application of mathematics to physics paved the way for its application to psychology, and the benefits secured to biology from a study of the principles of evolution (I speak not of its extreme form), have opened a field to investigation in psychology. Professor Creighton has said (*Introductory Logic*, pp. 300-303): "The first efforts of intelligence to understand the world take the form of judgments of Quality. . . . Our thought, however, . . . pushes farther its work of analysis and construction. . . . And when this stage is reached, judgments of quality are already passing into the next higher type, judgments of Quantity." To a limited degree and in a different way, this is also asserted in the text before us; for it states that "when the effects of large changes in the degree of the stimulus are compared, introspection seems to affirm changes of quality as well as of quantity" (p. 58).

Exception must be taken to some of the remarks on judicious skipping. Free-Will is one of the most complex subjects in the whole domain of psychology. It is hedged in with difficulties. It presupposes a settlement of many of the questions bearing on sensation, emotion, intellection, and even heredity, and environment. To recommend the general reader to begin with this chapter, and then proceed to such topics as the spirituality of the soul, theories of the ego, etc., is advising a course that is out of harmony with the ordinary rules of method.

No attempt has been made to illustrate the application of psychological principles to the art of teaching, nor does the scope of the work call for this. The indications in the Preface of the matter "of most use from the standpoint of the theory of education," do not afford any immediate help to the teacher. Some practical hints in the sections on Attention, Mental Association, Imagination, Memory, and Character would have added not a little to the value of the book.

The volume is an expression of the Neo-Scholastic movement—a movement in which Gutberlet, Mercier, Farges, and others are notable factors, and it deserves a wide circle of readers.

BROTHER CHRYSOSTOM.